

THE LONDON TIMES
3 December 1976

Favourite for CIA post wants it to 'go public'

From Patrick Brogan
Washington, Dec 2

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has been out of the news for the past six months, and prayers of thanks are doubtless said daily at its headquarters.

Last year was the low point in the agency's history, but the troubles began with its involvement in Watergate. Then things got out of control with the revelation that the CIA had been involved in illegal counter-intelligence operations at home and assassination plots abroad.

It has had three directors since 1972: Mr James Schlesinger, Mr William Colby and Mr George Bush. Mr Bush has not been invited to stay on by Mr Jimmy Carter and the President-elect's choice of a new director is one of his more important first decisions.

One of the possible candidates, Dr Ray Cline, has just published a book on the CIA, suggesting reforms which he thinks should be introduced immediately. During the 1960s he was deputy director of the intelligence side of the agency (as opposed to the branch which ran spies and secret armies) and he left for the State Department in 1969. He now teaches at Georgetown University.

His book is discreet about his reasons for leaving the CIA after a quarter of a century—it is discreet about everything—but it seems as though he felt that those who collected information, analysed it and passed it on to the proper authorities were losing the bureaucratic battle to those who mounted secret operations and did what the President told them.

Mr Richard Helms, who was director at the time, was also apparently sceptical about the

'There is still a need for some spies out in the cold, but the most important intelligence gathering can be done in Washington'

value of special operations, and a great believer in the superior virtues of intelligence analysis. However, he went along with the ideas of Mr Lyndon Johnson and Mr Richard Nixon and did not resign. Dr Cline was the wiser man.

The American Revolution of 1973-76 not only disposed of Mr Nixon and his methods of government; it also settled the dispute, in the CIA. The "school" of Dr Cline is now so much in the ascendant that it is probably safe for years to come.

Besides Dr Cline's wish to change the agency's name to the Central Institute of Foreign Affairs Research, there are other more important things in his book. His first point is that governments must exert every effort to find out what enemies or potential enemies are doing. This means reading, looking and listening: every Soviet publication must be studied, satellites must photograph everything visible from the air, and the world's radio signals must be listened to and interpreted.

Then everything must be analysed, and the information must go to the people who need to know it.

Recent history contains many instances of information being

ignored or overlooked. Pearl Harbour was one disastrous example, and the CIA's duty is to make sure that it never happens again. Nevertheless, the Vietnamese surprised the Americans in 1968 and the Arabs did so again in 1973.

Dr Cline argues that there is still need for some spies "out in the cold," but insists that the most important part of intelligence gathering can be done in Washington. He then observes that up to 75 per cent of the intelligence collected by the CIA could be made public.

Spies and special operations should be kept entirely separate from the main agency, and there should be a clandestine services staff somewhere in the executive to look after them, supervised in great secrecy by the director of central intelligence. This man would have Cabinet rank and would direct the affairs of all the Foreign information-gathering branches of the United States Government.

Everything would depend on a restoration of good relations between the agency and Congress. Mr Bush has done his best (he is a former congressman) but there is still a long way to go. Dr Cline wants a small committee of senior con-

gressmen in each House to supervise every aspect of both the main agency and the clandestine services staff.

Dr Cline has other proposals for the era after Dr Kissinger retires as Secretary of State. He suggests ways for necessary information to circulate in the Government, saying that if senior officials had listened to anyone who knew about Cyprus they would not have been surprised when the Turks intervened, and that if someone had told the Agriculture Department that the Soviet harvest had failed it would not have been surprised when the Russians bought up the American grain surplus and played havoc with United States domestic prices.

This all fits in with Mr Carter's apparent predilections, and completes the reforms proposed by the Senate and begun by President Ford.

On the other hand, the supporters of the magazine *Counterspy* and Mr Philip Agee would probably not agree with most of it. They, too, have just published a book—*The Lawless State: the Crimes of the United States Intelligence Agencies*—which describes in harrowing detail many of the past mistakes of the CIA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the White House.

Its principal author is Mr Morton Halperin, a former colleague of Dr Cline in the National Security Council and the State Department and now a thorn in Dr Kissinger's side.

His conclusions on the way the CIA should be reorganized are similar to Dr Cline's, with the important exception that Mr Halperin wants to stop spying altogether and to prohibit "special operations" by law.

Secrets, Spies and Scholars, by Ray Cline, Acropolis, \$10.